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section 16(b) is in order.4 Such is the suggestion of the Court.4" The amend-
ment could clearly state what standard is to be used to carry out the statutory
purpose. There would also be a clear expression of congressional intent in
situations similar to Reliance Electric, giving the Congress an opportunity to
impose liability for such profits or affirm the position of the Supreme Court.
Dudley W. Murrey
Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life and Casualty
Co.: Supreme Court Expansion of Rule 1Ob-5
Bankers Life and Casualty Company, one of the respondents and owner of
Manhattan Casualty Company, agreed to sell all of Manhattan's stock to
Begole for $5,000,000. Begole, conspiring with Bourne and others, conceived
a plan to purchase Manhattan's stock with Manhattan's own assets. The con-
spirators arranged through Garvin, Bantel, a note brokerage firm, to have a
$5,000,000 check issued to them by Irving Trust Company, although they
had no funds on deposit with the bank at the time. Manhattan then sold its
treasury bonds to realize the $5,000,000 necessary to cover the check.' Irving
Trust then issued a second $5,000,000 check to Manhattan, which Manhattan
in turn negotiated to Belgian American Trust, through Sweeny as president of
Manhattan (Sweeney having been installed in that office by the conspirators).
Belgian American gave Manhattan a certificate of deposit in return. Sweeney
endorsed the certificate of deposit to New England Note, which was controlled
by Bourne. Bourne endorsed the certificate of deposit to Belgian American
Banking in return for a $5,000,000 loan to New England Note. The proceeds
of this note were sent to Irving Trust to cover the second check. As a result,
Manhattan was left with neither assets nor treasury bonds, Begole with all
of Manhattan's stock, and Belgian American Banking with a $5,000,000
deposit. The Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York, represent-
ing Manhattan as receiver, alleged a fraud in the sale of Manhattan's treasury
" It has been suggested that there is the possibility of liability for the profits realized
on the trading of inside information (as is the case here) under rule lOb-5 of the Securities
and Exchange Commission. 2 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIEs LAW: FRAUD, § 12.4 (1971);
Lowenfels, supra note 12, at 61. There is the possibility of problems of proof inherent in
the use of rule 10b-5 which will limit the effectiveness of this rule in the regulation of the
profits gained under a plan such as Emerson used. As the Court admits, there are situations
where no use of inside information is made while an honest profit is realized. In such a
case there would be no point of application for rule 10b-5, which is based on the fraudu-
lent use of material inside information. However, Reliance Electric does join in that trend
of judicial thought that would narrow the applicability of § 16(b), while broadening that
of rule 10b-5. Profits retained as in Emerson's transaction may now be reached most effec-
tively through rule 10b-5, although only where there are fraudulent dealings.
49404 U.S. at 425.
' Manhattan sold its United States Treasury Bonds for $4,854,552.67. The amount from
the sale of the bonds plus the necessary cash to total $5,000,000 was then credited to Man-
hattan's account at Irving Trust and the $5,000,000 Irving Trust check was charged against it.
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bonds! in violation of certain provisions of the Securities Act of 1933' and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.' The federal district court dismissed the action
for failure to state a federal cause of action.' The Second Circuit affirmed.'
Held, reversed and remanded: Securities Exchange Act section 10(b) and
rule 10b-5 must be read flexibly, not technically and restrictively; therefore,
this scheme of financing the sale of securities may be classified as a fraud in
connection with the sale of securities, since the corporation must be protected
against deceptive devices which deprive the corporation of compensation for
the sale of its securities. Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casual-
ty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1972).
I. SECTION 10(b) AND RULE 10b-5
Section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, adopted by the Securities and Exchange
Commission, prohibit fraudulent securities transactions, and a violation of this
section or rule has been held by the courts to give a defrauded party to a
securities transaction a private civil cause of action.7 Section 10(b) lays down
a sweeping injunction against fraud, leaving it up to the SEC to define that
term. The section makes it unlawful "[tlo use or employ, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security . . .any manipulative or deceptive device
or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Com-
mission may prescribe .... "
In accordance with this power to define, the SEC has adopted rule lOb-5,
which provides that "[i1t shall be unlawful for any person .. . (a) [tJo em-
ploy any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) [tjo make any untrue
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact ... or (c) [tIo
engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security."'
These provisions constitute an attempt on the part of Congress and the SEC
to outlaw fraud in the purchase or sale of securities in the most pervasive
language possible. Courts have repeatedly stated that the common-law concept
'Manhattan's board of directors was allegedly deceived into authorizing the sale by the
misrepresentation that the proceeds would be exchanged for a certificate of deposit of equal
value.
'Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970).4 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
' Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 300 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
'Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 430 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1970).
'The implication of this private civil cause of action based on a violation of § 10(b)
originated in the case of Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
See also Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426
(1964); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951). As stated in Shell
v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819, 827 (5th Cir. 1970):
When a person who is dealing with a corporation in a securities transaction
denies the corporation's directors access to material information known to him,
the corporation is disabled from availing itself of an informed judgment on
the part of the board regarding the merits of the transaction. In this situation
the private right of action recognized under Rule 10b-5 is available as a
remedy for the corporate disability.
See Comment, Private Remedies Available Under Rule 1Ob-5, 20 Sw. L.J. 620 (1966).
'Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
9 17 C.F.R. 5 240.10b-5 (Supp. 1972). There must also be some contact with interstate
commerce. Id.
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of fraud has no bearing on the definition of fraud under section 10(b) or
rule 10b-5." Consequently, actions under these provisions have been popular
with plaintiffs who might have been substantially hampered by the technicali-
ties of common-law fraud. Moreover, actions under section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5 are often advantageous to plaintiffs bringing shareholder derivative
suits who might have been blocked procedurally by short statutes of limita-
tions, security-for-expense requirements, or other state procedural require-
ments.
Under the authority of section 10(b), the "catch-all" clause" of the Ex-
change Act, the SEC promulgated rule 10b-5 to render unlawful all fraudulent
schemes in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. Since Kardon
v. National Gypsum Co." the courts have inferred private rights of action for
violations of the rule, and have broadly construed section 10(b) and rule
1Ob-5 to impose few restrictions on the defrauded claimant. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has stated that the securities laws should be construed "not
technically or restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate . .. [their] remedial pur-
poses."' 4 Public and private corporations, 1 purchasers and sellers,'" corporate
insiders, 7 and corporate outsiders 8 have all been held to fall within the scope
of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. As a result of this vast growth of private
rights, certain doctrines have been enunciated by the federal courts which
purport to limit the class of plaintiffs who have standing to sue under section
10(b) and rule 10b-5."
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE
"IN CONNECTION WITH" REQUIREMENT
Every 10(b) and 10b-5 lawsuit must initially overcome an important bar-
"Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963); Norris & Hirshberg v. SEC, 177 F.2d
228 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943), cert.
denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944). The Supreme Court, in dealing with the meaning of fraud
under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, stated that it could not find that:
Congress, in empowering the courts to enjoin any practice which operates
,as a fraud or deceit' intended to require proof of intent to injure and actual
injury to clients.
T .. here has also been a growing recognition by common-law courts
that the doctrines of fraud and deceit which developed around transactions
involving land and other tangible items of wealth are ill-suited to the sale of
such intangibles as advice and securities, and that, accordingly, the doctrines
must be adapted to the merchandise in issue.
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 192-94 (1963).
" In actions under rule lOb-5, federal courts do not apply any security-for-expenses re-
quirements but do apply the state statute of limitations. See McClure v. Borne Chem. Co.,
292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1961); Klein v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg, 306 F. Supp. 743 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
"See Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the Subcomm. on Stock Exchange
Regulation of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
115 (1934) (testimony of Mr. Thomas G. Corcoran), quoted in A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES
LAW: FRAu--SEC RULE 10b-5, § 2.2(332), at 22.4 (1971).
1"69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946); see note 7 supra.
14SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
1 Schine v. Schine, 250 F. Supp. 822 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
"'Studebaker Corp. v. Allied Prods. Corp., 256 F. Supp. 173 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
17 Ruckle v. Roto American Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cit. 1964).
18United States v. Re, 336 F.2d 306 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 904 (1964).
"Five such limitations are discussed in Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d
540, 543-44 (2d Cir. 1967).
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rier in the requirement of both section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 that the statement,
act, or device must have occurred in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security. Litigation over the scope of the "in connection with" require-
ment has usually arisen in situations involving the standing of the plaintiff
to sue under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. Generally, the "in connection
with" requirement has been liberally construed by the courts."
This restriction was first enunciated in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp."5
In Birnbaum minority shareholders of Newport brought a derivative suit on
behalf of the corporation, and a class action as representatives of all similarly
situated shareholders under rule lOb-5. The complaint alleged that the presi-
dent and controlling stockholder of Newport had sold his controlling interest
at a substantial premium while rejecting a merger which would have been
highly profitable to Newport shareholders. The plaintiffs contended that
such actions constituted fraudulent practices in connection with the purchase
or sale of securities within the meaning of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.
Judge Learned Hand, speaking for the Second Circuit, dismissed the action
and held that section 10(b) "was directed solely at that type of misrepresenta-
tion or fraudulent practice usually associated with the sale or purchase of
securities rather than at fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs, and
that Rule X-10B-5 extended protection only to the defrauded purchaser or
seller."2
In effect, the Birnbaum doctrine consists of two elements. First, a plaintiff
has no standing to sue unless he has been defrauded in connection with his
purchase or sale of securities. Second, corporate wrongdoings are not cognizable
under rule 10b-5 unless they are of the type "usually associated with the
purchase or sale of securities" rather than fraudulent mismanagement of
corporate affairs." As late as 1964, in O'Neill v. Maytag," a federal court, in
reaffirming the principles in Birnbaum, was reluctant to permit relief under
rule lOb-5 when the alleged breach of duty resembled a breach of general
corporate fiduciary duties more than a deception perpetrated on shareholders."
Following the O'Neill decision, a trend toward liberalization of the coverage
of the "in connection with" restriction began. The trend resulted in a pro-
20See, e.g., Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 252 F. Supp. 212, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
21193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
2 1 Id. at 464.
23 Id.
-339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964).
2 The action was a shareholder's derivative suit for alleged violation of the Securities
Exchange Act and the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1970), arising out
of an air carrier's purchase of its own securities. In a 2-to-1 decision, the Second Circuit held
that plaintiff had not stated a claim cognizable under § 10(b) and rule lob-5 because no
deception had been perpetrated by the defendants:
Between principal and agent and among corporate officers, directors, and
shareholders, state law has created duties which exist independently of the
sale of stock. . . .The question posed by this case is whether it is sufficient
for an action under Rule 10b-5 to allege a breach of one of these general
fiduciary duties where the breach does not involve deception. We think it
is not. At least where the duty allegedly breached is only the general duty
existing among corporate officers, directors and shareholders, no cause of ac-
tion is stated under Rule 10b-5 unless there is an allegation of facts amount-
ing to deception.
339 F.2d at 767-68.
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scription of all fraudulent activity in connection with a securities transaction,
not only fraudulent activity usually associated with the purchase or sale of
securities. The enlargement of the section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5 coverage
beyond the usual and commonplace fraudulent securities transactions was
illustrated in AT. Brod & Co. v. Perlow." In Brod a stockbroker brought a
1Ob-5 action against one of his customers who allegedly intended to pay for
ordered securities only if the price went up by the settlement date. The Second
Circuit described the district court's restriction of 10b-5 coverage to "fraud
usually associated with the sale or purchase of securities" and relating to the
investment value of the securities as "much too narrow.""7 The court said that
rule lOb-5 was designed to "prohibit all fraudulent schemes in connection
with the purchase or sale of securities, whether the artifices employed involve
a garden type variety of fraud or present a unique form of deception."" The
court further stated that "[niovel or atypical methods should not provide im-
munity from the securities laws." 9 Thus, Brod represents a departure from
Birnbaum in that rule 1Ob-5 was held to include all fraudulent activity rather
than merely fraudulent schemes of the type usually associated with securities
transactions."0
Since Brod, the federal courts have continued to expand the scope of section
10(b) and rule 1Ob-5. Generally, the decisions can be categorized within two
areas of corporate misdeeds cognizable under the provisions: "(1) deceptions
and misrepresentations; and (2) fraudulent mismanagement of the corporation
by its directors when the mismanagement involves a purchase or sale of
securities by the corporation."'"
The "in connection with" clause has usually been construed in a broad
manner whenever materially misleading statements or deceptive insider activi-
ties have been discovered." In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co." directors had
purchased company stock on the basis of material inside information, and then
issued deceptive press releases to the public. The court, in determining whether
there had been a 10b-5 violation, concluded that the purpose of the 1934 Act
indicated the necessity of a broad interpretation of the rule.' The court found
that the "in connection with" phrase was intended to cover a device "of a
sort that would cause reasonable investors to rely thereon, and in connection
therewith, so relying, cause them to purchase or sell the corporation's securi-
ties." Moreover, the court reasoned that the scope of the rule must be assessed
29375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967).
I7 ld. at 396.
I8 ld. at 397.
ld.
20In Glickman v. Schweickart & Co., 242 F. Supp. 670, 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), the
court similarly held that rule 10b-5 was not limited to misrepresentations relating to the
subject matter of the purchase but also included misrepresentations concerning the means
of financing the purchase.
31 See Comment, S.E.C. Rule lOb-5-"ln Connection With the Purchase or Sale of Any
Security" Restriction: Need for Analytical Precision, 5 COLUM. J. LAW & Soc. PROB., No.
2, Aug. 1969, at 28, 32.
32Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Cooper v. North
Jersey Trust Co., 226 F. Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).




in light of the purposes of the legislation from which it was derived, i.e., "to
promote free and open public securities markets and to protect the investing
public from suffering inequities in trading."3
In Heit v. Weitzen 7 the court referred to the principles enunciated in Texas
Gulf Sulphur, and stated:
There is no necessity for contemporaneous trading in securities by insiders
or by the corporation itself. 'Rule 10b-5 is violated whenever assertions are
made ... in a manner reasonably calculated to influence the investing public
... if such assertions are [so] false or misleading ... as to mislead irrespective
of whether the issuance of the release was motivated by corporate officials for
ulterior purposes.'3
Thus, it appears that any person, including a corporation, may be held to have
used a deceptive device in connection with a securities transaction, regardless
of his intent, if the device or contrivance is of a sort that may reasonably be
relied upon by the investing public."
The second aspect of the "in connection with" litigation involves the ques-
tion of whether an action for a fiduciary breach can be brought under section
10(b) and rule 10b-5. This question relates to the dictum of Birnbaum that
action which is merely "fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs" is
not actionable under the antifraud provisions of the securities laws."
Later case law, exemplified by O'Neill v. Maytag,"5 had limited the coverage
of rule 10b-5 to situations in which there was an actual deception of the
board of directors by officers or other directors. A fiduciary breach, standing
alone, without the presence of an actual deception, was not considered a vio-
lation of rule 10b-5.' McClure v. Borne Chemical Co.," on the other hand,
articulated the broadest use of the provisions as general remedies for breaches
of fiduciary duties. In the Third Circuit's view, section 10(b) "imposes broad
fiduciary duties on management vis-4-vis the corporation and its individual
stockholders .... Section 10(b) provides stockholders with a potent weapon
for the enforcement of many fiduciary duties."" McClure's sweeping interpre-
tation of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 as a virtually unlimited federal remedy
for breaches of fiduciary obligations has not, however, met with unqualified
judicial acceptance.
In Ruckle v. Roto American Corp." a minority director was allowed to
IId. at 858.
31402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968).3 1 Id. at 913, quoting in part from SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 860-61
(2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
31 See Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968). See also Stockwell v. Reynolds
& Co., 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), in which the court stated that fraudulent mis-
representations which induced an investor to defer the sale of securities, resulting in loss,
were "in connection with" the sale of securities under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5; Goodman
v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1967), in which the fraudulent acts of
certain securities brokers, including the false representations that they were buying and
selling securities on behalf of plaintiff investors, were held to be "in connection with" the
sales and purchases of securities within the meaning of § 10(b) and rule 10b-5.
4See note 21 supra, and accompanying text.
41 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964).
'See note 23 supra, and accompanying text.
"292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1961).
14 Id. at 834.
'339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964).
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bring a derivative action under rule lOb-5 against the majority directors. It
was alleged that the board was deceived by the withholding of the latest
financial statement, and, as a result of the deception, issued to the president a
sufficient number of shares to permit him to maintain his control. The court
refused to dismiss the suit, holding that rule 10b-5 is available when a cor-
poration is actually defrauded into issuing securities." In Schoenbaum v. First-
brook47 the Second Circuit permitted a derivative suit for a company's sale of
securities at an inadequate price to persons exercising a controlling influence
over it, holding that the directors were guilty of deceiving the stockholders.
The court relied on dicta in Ruckle, stating that a majority or even the entire
board of directors may be held to have defrauded their corporation.
Thus, the great weight of authority is that a cause of action under section
10(b) and rule lOb-5 is not limited to those frauds usually associated with
the purchase or sale of securities, but can be used to police all fraudulent
schemes in connection with a securities transaction regardless of how unique
or uncommon the fraud or deception might be. Under this expanded concept
of coverage, section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 are increasingly available to attack
breaches of fiduciary duties involving fraud or deception in connection with
securities transactions.
III. SUPERINTENDENT OF INSURANCE V. BANKERS LIFE & CASUALTY Co.
In considering the scope of the "in connection with" requirement, the Su-
preme Court, in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,"
faced a section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 problem for only the second time." The
appellants claimed that a majority of the board of directors was deceived by
misrepresentations of other members of the board and some of the defendants,
and, therefore, believed that the corporation itself would receive the proceeds
from the sale of the bonds. On the basis of the fraudulent representations, the
board was induced to authorize the sale of the bonds in exchange for a cer-
tificate of deposit without value to the corporation.
The respondent, Bankers Life, contended that the opinions in Texas Gulf
Sulphur"0 and Heit v. Weitzen ' precluded recovery under section 10(b).
Specifically, Bankers Life relied on the language in Texas Gulf Sulphur which
limited the scope of the section to the purpose of the legislation, which the
court found to be "to promote free and open public securities markets and
to protect the investing public.""5 The court in Texas Gulf Sulphur also re-
stricted the scope of the "in connection with" requirement to only that sort
of device upon which reasonable investors would rely." Drawing on this
"Id. at 28.
47405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
41404 U.S. 6 (1971).
41In its first confrontation with § 10(b) and rule lOb-5, the Supreme Court considered
only the scope of the words "purchase or sale" in the context of merger situations. The
Court found that a merger involves a purchase and sale, and that § lOb-5 may apply to a
proxy solicitation. SEC v. National Secs., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
- SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc); see notes
33-36 supra, and accompanying text.
51402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968).
5 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 858 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
" ld. at 860.
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language, the respondents contended that the fraud in no way affected either
the securities markets or the investing public, and, thus, was not actionable
under section 10(b).
The Supreme Court found that although one of the purposes of section
10(b) was the "preservation of the integrity of the securities market," the
scope of the section was not limited to that purpose. Drawing upon language
from the Capital Gains case, the Court broadly construed the scope of section
10(b) and rule lOb-5 and the "in connection with" requirement and stated
that "Section 10(b) must be read flexibly, not technically and restrictively."
''
In reaching its conclusion, the Court looked through the myriad of lower
federal court decisions to the congressionally intended scope of the Securities
Exchange Act as enunciated by Congress in 1934. Specifically, the Court drew
on two statements from the congressional report: (1) "disregard of trust
relationships by those whom the law should regard as fiduciaries are all a
single seamless web" along with manipulations, investor's ignorance, and the
like;" and (2) in the securities field "where practices constantly vary and
where practices legitimate for some purposes may be turned to illegitimate
and fraudulent means, broad discretionary powers" in the regulatory agency
"have been found practically essential." 7 Under such a flexible reading of
section 10(b) the Court found that there was a sale of a security, and since
fraud was used in connection with the securities transaction, the action was
cognizable under section 10(b). The heart of the case was that "Manhattan
suffered an injury as a result of deceptive practices touching on its sale of
securities. "
The Court then paid lip service to the Birnbaum dictum 9 that section 10(b)
was not intended to encompass transactions which comprise no more than in-
ternal corporate mismanagement, but, in essence, so restricted this thought
that it is meaningless. Again, the Court did not rely on case law but looked
instead to the congressional intent. The Court stated that by section 10(b)
Congress intended to bar deceptive devices and contrivances in the purchase
or sale of securities "whether conducted in the organized markets or face-to-
face."" By stating that disregard of trust relationships by fiduciaries and
manipulation are all a "single seamless web," the Court was essentially
combining the concepts of fiduciary breach of duties and securities fraud. The
Court further stated that the controlling stockholder owes the corporation a
fiduciary obligation--one "designed for the protection of the entire community
of interests in the corporation--creditors as well as stockholders.""5 Although
'SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
15 404 U.S. at 12.
'Hearings on H.R. 1383, supra note 12, at 6.
5 Ild. at 7.
58404 U.S. at 12-13. When a person who is dealing with a corporation in a securities
transaction denies the corporation's directors access to material information known to him,
the corporation is disabled from availing itself of an informed judgment on the part of its
board regarding the merits of the transaction. In this situation the private right of action
recognized under rule 10b-5 is available as a remedy for the corporate disability. Shell v.
Hensley, 430 F.2d 819, 827 (5th Cir. 1970). See also note 7 supra, and accompanying text.
5 See notes 21-25 supra, and accompanying text; 404 U.S. at 9.
6Od. at 12.
61 Id., citing Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07 (1939).
NOTES1972]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
it did not expressly so state, it may be reasonably inferred that the Court was
saying that fiduciary breaches of duties were cognizable under section 10(b)
if in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. Since the respondent
owed Manhattan a fiduciary duty, and breached that fiduciary obligation by
virtue of a fraud in connection with a securities transaction, a cause of action
existed under section 10(b).
Thus, the Court appears to be making a strong move to open up section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 to include what has traditionally been an area of state
law. However, the Court's opinion is cryptic in that the Court in several in-
stances strongly hints that fiduciary breaches are actionable under the section
and the rule, but never expressly says whether this result is intended. It appears
that it would have been preferable for the Court to make a definite move,
and then define within what limits fiduciary breaches in connection with
securities transactions may be brought under the provisions.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Bankers Life decision is noteworthy in historical perspective in that the
Court does not retreat from the broad application of section 10(b) and rule
10b-5 previously adopted by lower courts. The opinion is significant in that
the Court went back to the congressional intent in enacting the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 to avoid some of the restrictions that the lower courts
had placed on the section. The Court broadly construed the "in connection
with" requirement and seems to have somewhat weakened the concept that
fiduciary breaches are not actionable under the provisions. Thus, it appears that
the Court, in moving strongly to open up section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, has
adopted a broad interpretation of the provisions that will affect many everyday
transactions.
The opinion, however, is far from satisfactory. Although a reasonable
analogy supports the inference that the Supreme Court intends that fiduciary
breaches of duties in connection with securities transactions are within the
proscription of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, the Court never concretely
states its opinion. Rather, the Court hinted strongly that such actions are
actionable under the provisions. Further, the Court did not give adequate
consideration to the various factors and situations in bringing a suit for a fiduci-
ary breach under the provisions of the section and the rule. Perhaps in an
attempt to provide simple rules for judging 10(b) and 10b-5 cases, the Court
has been guilty of oversimplification, establishing flexible standards for
judging the scope of the provisions while compounding the litigation potenti-
alities by speaking in generalities and failing to set definitive bounds.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court's consideration of this vast problem
area, which has heretofore been reviewed by the Court only once, may imply
that in the near future additional cases concerning section 10(b) and rule
10b-5 may be heard. In this sense, the decision represents a tempered judicial
broadening of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 which will require further
judicial interpretation.
Steven R. Jenkins
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